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Abstract Open-source communities that focus on content
rely squarely on the contributions of invisible strangers in
cyberspace. How do such communities handle the problem
of trusting that strangers have good intentions and adequate
competence? This question is explored in relation to
communities in which such trust is a vital issue: peer
production of software (FreeBSD and Mozilla in particular)
and encyclopaedia entries (Wikipedia in particular). In the
context of open-source software, it is argued that trust was
inferred from an underlying ‘hacker ethic’, which already
existed. The Wikipedian project, by contrast, had to create
an appropriate ethic along the way. In the interim, the
assumption simply had to be that potential contributors
were trustworthy; they were granted ‘substantial trust’.
Subsequently, projects from both communities introduced
rules and regulations which partly substituted for the need
to perceive contributors as trustworthy. They faced a
design choice in the continuum between a high-discretion
design (granting a large amount of trust to contributors)
and a low-discretion design (leaving only a small amount
of trust to contributors). It is found that open-source
designs for software and encyclopaedias are likely to
converge in the future towards a mid-level of discretion. In
such a design the anonymous user is no longer invested
with unquestioning trust.
Keywords Design  Discretion  FreeBSD 
Hacker ethic  Mozilla  Open source software 
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Introduction
From the 1980s on, the concept of trust has attracted
renewed interest in disciplines like philosophy, the social
sciences and economics. Especially important contribu-
tions were made by Luhmann (1968), Baier (1986, 1992),
Gambetta (1988) and Pettit (1995). Conceptually, trust was
understood as the phenomenon of reliance on the good
intentions and/or adequate competences of others in situa-
tions characterized by dependence, vulnerability and risk.
The particular example of a trusting situation, introduced
by Dale Zand decades ago, is still a valid exemplar:
entrusting one’s child to a babysitter.
The usual mechanism by which one decides to trust
others on whom one may perhaps rely is inference: their
reputation based on past performance, certain perceived
individual characteristics like sex or ethnicity, or institu-
tions to which they can be linked inspire confidence in the
transaction under consideration (Zucker 1986). Trustwor-
thiness is inferred. Likewise, a shared culture and the
specific context of the transaction—with actors involved
calculating the costs and benefits of their actions—may be
supposed to justify the inference of trust. More rarely,
people may simply assume trustworthiness absent any
clues to that effect, and just decide to act as if trust were
present; one may actually produce trust, precisely by acting
as if it is present (Gambetta 1988). The mechanisms
underlying such an assumption of trust, in virtual life in
particular, have been elucidated by Pettit (2004) and de
Laat (2005).
If people continuously interact in ‘trust situations’, rules
and regulations are likely to be introduced. Hierarchy,
procedures, and contracts are relevant instances. This is
when a third mechanism for handling the trust problem
emerges (whether applied wittingly to that end or not).
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Structure regulates mutual interactions by introducing
restrictions on behaviour; degrees of freedom are circum-
scribed or even eliminated. As a result, participants in the
system are, to varying degrees, no longer relied on; their
possible actions are restricted. The amount of trust that
needs to be invested in people is reduced to the extent that
rules restrain them. In other words, structural arrangements
may partly substitute for the need to perceive—or
assume—people as trustworthy (cf. Granovetter 1985;
Sitkin and Roth 1993). Note that this argument must not be
taken to imply that rules can mechanically ‘solve’ the trust
problem; some degree of actual trust will always be
needed.
In all a three-fold dynamics of trust emerges: of
assumption, inference, and substitution of trust. After a
brief survey of open-source communities in general,
arguments are presented, explaining why trust is a central
issue in the functioning of two particular examples: soft-
ware and encyclopaedias. The remainder of the paper is
then devoted to examining how this dynamics of trust
unfolds within the two communities.
Open-source communities and trust
In analogy with open-source software (OSS) ‘open-source
communities’ in general can be defined as peers producing
content together on a voluntary basis, without direction
from markets or managerial hierarchy, and posting their
created content in a virtual commons accessible to all.
This, of course, is the definition coined by Benkler (2006).
Social movements develop content collectively, both ‘by
the people’ and ‘for the people’. A new mode of production
is born. It all started with OSS, which attracted increasing
numbers of participants with the advent of the Internet.
Subsequently the movement spread from software to other
kinds of content: encyclopaedias, journals, books, movies
and more came to be produced in an open-source fashion.
Note, though, that the epithet ‘open-source’ in these
instances just refers to the circumstance that contributed
content is readily made available for distribution, refine-
ment and modification—the typical software distinction
between source code and object code no longer applies.
A mode of production like this opens the gates to the
outside world for everybody. Anybody is invited to con-
tribute inputs that are relevant to the project. But to what
extent can these suggestions be relied onto make a valuable
contribution, and be taken into account or ultimately inte-
grated into the official, up-to-date version of the project
concerned? Put the other way round: to what extent can one
be sure that the incoming uploads are not disruptive or
undermine the collective cause? Some communities are
characterized by little interaction between contributors: the
project simply amasses all inputs together, like photo-
graphs, journal entries, or music samples. In such cases,
dubious quality inputs do little harm. However, when
contributors do interact continuously about interconnected
content that is ever-evolving, the quality problem becomes
more acute. Exemplary domains of content with such dense
interaction are software and encyclopaedias. With soft-
ware, one is invited to submit comments, bug reports, code
patches or new features in source code; with encyclopae-
dias, one is invited to submit comments or suggest changes
to existing entries, or suggest new entries altogether. In
both cases, the contents are in perpetual flux.
As soon as a project grows in size—and monitoring by a
single person becomes unfeasible—those in charge have to
ask themselves who can be trusted to provide valuable
comments and/or content, in a spirit of loyal cooperation
and proportional to their competences. Those—and only
those—worthy of one’s trust then can be given permission
to introduce their changes directly into the official version
as presented to the public. The defining body of content
(either the source code repository or the body of textual
entries as a whole) is entrusted, as it were, to a collective of
dedicated contributors to take care of. In contrast to one’s
child in the babysitter example, though, the goods being
entrusted are ever-expanding.
That trust is an issue can be shown quite specifically.
When OSS hackers create a tree of source code together,
inappropriate code may be a nuisance (cf. de Laat 2007:
p. 171). For one thing, code may be sloppy, of mediocre
quality, or contain bugs. For another, in a more malicious
vein, code may contain viruses that have the potential to
spread throughout the tree (‘malware’). If the official
repository is made accessible to a multitude of trusted
persons, considerable damage may result. The risk taken is
not insignificant, while cleaning a spoiled tree is a nuisance
that can take many hours of painstaking work. One has to
roll back to earlier versions of the repository and start anew
without the contested code. Subsequent source code
changes have to be reintroduced one after the other.
Although in practice larger OSS projects are split up into
modules that run in parallel, thereby reducing this risk,
some element of risk still remains.
Project leaders in OSS are often acutely aware of the
problem. From an online survey it transpired that source-
forge developers do consider interpersonal trust important
for the effectiveness of OSS communities (Lane et al.
2004). In particular they identified obtaining write access to
the repository as a matter of trust that has to be gained by
adequate performance. Compare the following quotations:
Once a potential project participant has proved his/
her interest by submitting relevant code changes and
expressing an interest to write more code, this is
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normally enough for them to gain the trust of existing
project members. Once trusted a participant is typi-
cally given commit rights to the source repository,
and can thus freely change the code base.
Free Software is generally a trusting community.
However, it is generally accepted that a new guy is
not trusted. This means that a new guy can’t just write
an email to the developer’s list and get write access to
the project’s CVS.1 A new guy has to build trust with
the project by submitting patches, useful criticism,
help, and testing, and so forth. Before someone can
have write access to CVS, they generally have to
demonstrate programming skills, an ability to take
criticism and use it constructively, work with a team,
and show that they are willing to work to resolve
problems.
The arch-father of Linux, the largest OSS project ever, is
also aware that trust is at stake. By nature not a trusting
kind of person, Linus Torvalds only extends his trust to a
few chosen lieutenants:
(…) I’m afraid that I don’t like the idea of having
developers do their own updates in my kernel source
tree. (…) I know that’s how others do it, and maybe
I’m paranoid, but there really aren’t that many people
that I trust enough to give write permissions to the
kernel tree. (retrieved from http://lkml.indiana.edu/
hypermail/linux/kernel/9602/1096.html)
A similar analysis applies to open-source encyclopaedias.
The entries that collectively make up an encyclopaedia can
obviously be spoiled by contributors with mala fide
intentions and/or poor capabilities. Wikipedia in particular
has by now accumulated ample experience on this point and
developed an amusing typology of such participants
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: RCO; henceforth
for all English Wikipedia references the prefix http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki will be omitted but presumed as the
default). ‘Cranks’ insert nonsense, ‘trolls’ and ‘flamers’ stir
up trouble, ‘amateurs’ disturb entries with their fake
knowledge, ‘partisans’ smuggle their point of view into
entries, and ‘advertizers’ find subtle ways to promote their
products. As a result, entries become unbalanced at best,
unreliable at worst. Having to monitor and redress such
disturbances is obviously a major task (more on this below).
So here, too, providing write access to the project’s
official body of content is a matter of trust: dependence,
vulnerability and risk are all involved. Inside Wikipedia, its
volunteer ‘officials’ are well aware that trust is involved.
This is most clearly shown by growing concerns about two
issues. On the one hand, the reliability of entries has
become a source of concern. In response, various quality
measures and procedures for verifying them have been
introduced (‘good’ article, ‘featured’ article). Moreover,
software schemes that colour chunks of text according to
their reliability are in the making. On the other hand, the
trustworthiness of contributors themselves is becoming a
critical issue. Should levels of ‘trusted users’ be distin-
guished—as opposed to ordinary users? Should such
‘trusted users’ specifically be charged to carry out quality
inspection of entries? Should such users police vandalizing
contributors? Obviously, the two initiatives, directed
towards both entries and the contributors behind them, are
seen as interrelated.
This issue of trust is explored below by a close analysis
of developments in both OSS communities (FreeBSD and
Mozilla in particular) and encyclopaedic communities
(Wikipedia in particular). This selection of cases is meant
to cover some typical open-source communities that cur-
rently exist. The central argument about the handling of
trust—whether by inference, assumption, or substitution—
can be briefly summarized as follows. In an initial phase
when projects are still small they usually rely exclusively
on the first two mechanisms (‘informal phase’).2 In this
respect OSS could rely on a culture common to the com-
munity as a whole: the ‘hacker ethic’. Contributors could
be supposed to adhere to this ethic and therefore be con-
sidered trustworthy enough. Wikipedia faced a much
harder problem. When it started, no relevant common
culture was in existence. As a result, trustworthiness could
not be inferred directly in any plausible way; the only
option was simply to go ahead and assume contributors
were trustworthy. Was this assumption based on any
rational underpinnings? The answer is found not so much
in the mechanism of seeking esteem (as proposed by Pet-
tit), but rather in the mechanism of substantial hope (as
proposed by McGeer). Potential contributors were called
onto develop and apply their encyclopaedic skills. To be
sure, in order to fill the cultural vacuum, a ‘wikiquette’
soon enough came to be developed inside Wikipedia as an
analogue of the hacker ethic.
In time rules and regulations were introduced, relating in
particular to a division of roles and decision making (de
Laat 2007). This is a common development as soon as
projects grow, both in terms of the number of participants
and the size of content created. In order to manage the
complexities involved, project leaders experience the need
1 CVS denotes Concurrent Versioning System: a software tool that
allows distributed contributors to work efficiently together on the
same tree of source code.
2 It has to be borne in mind though that most projects starting at
present will immediate adopt roles and procedures, simply because
standard models for them are available for the taking. As a result, all
three mechanisms for handling trust come to the fore simultaneously.
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to structure their projects. The link with trust is that rules
may substitute for trust—and so reduce the trust needed. It
is important to emphasize, though, that such governance by
rules and regulations may vary across projects. On the one
hand, rules may be designed starting from the premise that
participants can be fully trusted. A maximum amount of
participant discretion will be designed in, so to speak. On
the other hand, the leading presumption may be the
opposite: participants cannot be trusted to deliver reliable
content of their own accord, so as little discretion as pos-
sible—without stifling voluntary contribution altogether—
is granted by the structural design. A low-discretion design
signalling low trust is the outcome. In between these
extremes, a continuum ranges from high to low discre-
tionary design. It is argued that the design of open-source
software and encyclopaedia production seems to be con-
verging to a medium level of discretion.
Open-source software: hacker ethic
The origins of the OSS movement go back to the 1980s.
Hackers—as they prefer to call themselves—used to freely
exchange pieces of source code they had written. Large
companies then started to enforce some of their alleged
intellectual property rights over software. In particular,
AT&T sought to protect UNIX. In response, hackers rallied
together in an effort to keep the source code free (i.e.,
freely available). As a result, famous packages like Free-
BSD (with a BSD licence) and the GNU Emacs editor
(with a GPL) were developed. In the early 1990s, the
Internet—itself largely the fruit of such open-source prac-
tices—boosted participation in open-source projects. Peo-
ple from anywhere around the globe could join with one
click of the mouse. As a result, the number of OSS projects
and participants rose sharply. Estimates of the total number
of OSS projects currently underway amount to over
100,000 (on platforms like Freshmeat and Sourceforge).
Precisely this Internet-boosted era is central to my
investigation. In the initial stages at least, regulating rules
were few and far between. Someone usually initiated a
project by putting a source code proposal on the web and
inviting comments, patches and new features. This initia-
tor—usually male—then operated as project leader, trying
to manage the whole undertaking. The number of people
responding could assume astonishing proportions. Larger
projects easily attracted the attention of thousands of peo-
ple out there (as evidenced by their downloads); among
those, hundreds might actually send input back to the
project, whether comments or code.
An astonishing feature of this open-source process is the
near-total trust invested in strangers—outside a core of
close friends, which often also existed. After having made
a few useful patches, contributors were easily welcomed as
developer, with permission to upload code into the official
tree of the project. This was a big ‘bazaar’ indeed, virtually
without rank and distinction, all babbling together and
hacking away at the code tree. But what about the quality
of these return gifts of code? Might some of these possibly
be misguided, poorly formulated, misleading, outright
irrelevant, or even poisonous? Might the code tree become
corrupted as a result? All these objections notwithstanding,
leaders—at least in this initial phase—practiced near-total
trust towards strangers and did not attempt to delineate
trust more carefully. This only happened later.
On what was this trust based? In ‘real life’, when we
meet people, we are used to being able to infer some degree
of trustworthiness from their characteristics. People’s
family background, ethnicity or sex may be interpreted as
providing trust in the prospective transaction (characteris-
tic-based trust; cf. Zucker 1986). Put otherwise, these
ascribed characteristics serve as flags that signal trust-
worthiness to observers. On the Internet, though—at least
initially—no such inferences about contributors are usually
available. Characteristics that might give clues about
trustworthiness are hidden from view. All one has are IP
addresses that present themselves, hopefully with useful
comments and code contributions.
Of course, these initial contributions could breed some
trust. To some extent leaders could infer trustworthiness
from past performance. In addition, however, the open
source hackers of the Internet era who were appealing to
unknown others to show their hacking capabilities did not
operate in a complete cultural void. When the Internet
opened up avenues for massive participation, they had the
cooperative experiences of decades behind them, albeit on
a much smaller scale. These were imbued with what has
come to be labelled the ‘hacker ethic’. This conception was
first coined by Steven Levy (1984) to describe computer
wizards from the 1960s to the 1990s. True hacking as a
way of life revolves around spectacular and novel ways of
using the available capabilities of computing. Throughout,
the emphasis is on constructive cooperation and sharing.
Bureaucracy, security, passwords, and copyrights are
detested as just so many bureaucratic impediments to
fruitful exchange. Pekka Himanen (2001) suggested even
grander dimensions for the ethic of the 1990s hackers,
closely tied to OSS development. In his vision, such
hacking is a creative passion that is embedded in a new
work ethic for the information age, which focuses on
sharing information and keeping the Internet open for all,
in a spirit of caring for all.
In the 1990s hackers of such persuasion took the Internet
route to developing OSS together, a move that came to
address a potentially much broader audience. Could it be
presupposed that the audience involved would be bound by
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the same ethical standards as ‘true’ hackers? My answer is
in the affirmative. The broader audience was on the one
hand composed of ‘true’ hackers living all over on the
globe, and on the other hand of members of the computer
underground, the ‘new’ hackers so to speak. The writings
of the latter bloc have been analyzed by Steven Mizrach
(1997). After distinguishing several categories of this
underground movement (such as system intruders, phone
phreaks and virus writers), he surveyed the do’s and don’ts
in their ethical self-conception. He finds a considerable
continuity between ‘old’ and ‘new’ hacker ethic. The fol-
lowing principles in the new hacker ethic are particularly
relevant for my purposes: share and exchange information
with other people; do not just take information and soft-
ware from other people (no hoarding, no freeloading); do
not damage anything when entering other computers or
data systems; do not crash others’ systems by destroying
hardware or data, by unleashing viruses, Trojans, or logical
bombs.
So new hackers also predominantly cooperate and share,
while avoiding damage and harm—in spite of the bad press
reports about the few that deviate from this moral baseline
(‘crackers’). This suggests that opening up source code
proposals to the world at large was not so irrational after
all. Amid the potentially thousands of downloaders, only a
small fraction could be expected to be knowledgeable
enough to be able to reciprocate. And that fraction would
seem to be bound by some kind of hacker ethic, whether of
the old or the new variety. The inference that their con-
tributions can be trusted seemed to be warranted. It was
only much later that such inferences could no longer be
upheld, a point that is explored below.
My conclusion therefore is that some kind of hacker
ethic was shared by the audience at large—at least by those
who were returning comments or code. As a result, this
hacker ethic was instrumental in making the OSS experi-
ment successful. Obviously, the question that arises is
whether and to what extent my analysis is shared by the
originators? That is, did they form an estimate of the
constructive attitude of global audiences, was that estimate
the same as mine, and did they consciously interpret it as
support for their open-source experiment on the scale of the
Internet? If the answer is positive, it implies that they took
a reasoned step when deciding to open up source code on
the Internet. If the answer is in the negative, however, it
implies that OSS originators embarked on a considerable
gamble by assuming trust worldwide. Someone like Eric
Raymond, who is steadfast in his portrayal of the phone-
phreaks involved as detestable and delinquent crackers, is a
case in point. In any case, there is to my knowledge no
more systematic or wider scale answer available.
Note that in my analysis culture plays a modest role in
creating trust. Being a true hacker cannot be reliably
signalled, due to the nature of virtual communications. A
potential trustor can thus never be sure that a specific
potential trustee indeed is a member of the hacker tribe.
(S)he only may obtain assurances of a statistical nature,
namely that the hacker ethic obtains in general. It is only a
climate of trust that is gauged (cf. Baier 1992, Pettit 1995).
A strong form of inference is replaced by a much weaker
one.
Wikipedia: encyclopaedic ideals
The movement to produce encyclopaedic entries in open-
source fashion is more recent in origin. It all started in 2000
with the American Nupedia, written and reviewed by
experts. While that undertaking was slow to take off, Wi-
kipedia, under the leadership of Jimmy Wales, was laun-
ched as a kind of experiment. Everybody, unregistered and
anonymous, became entitled to read and ‘edit’ entries in
the online encyclopaedia (‘editing’ meaning changing,
deleting, or adding content). Three ‘pillars’ have to be
observed in the process. ‘Neutral point of view’ means that
articles should represent all significant viewpoints to an
issue fairly, proportionately and without bias (Wikipedia:
NPOV); ‘no original research’ means there is no room for
original research of one’s own that has not yet been pub-
lished elsewhere (Wikipedia: NOR); and ‘verifiability’
means that all content that is likely to be challenged should
be traceable back to a reliable source (Wikipedia: V). Soon
enough this was a great success, at least numerically. Local
Wikipedias were created, in languages other than English,
numbering over 250 at the time of writing. The largest
Wikipedia (in English) contains over three million articles,
while a small one, such as the experimental one in Kirundi,
as yet contains only seven.
This movement is to a large extent modelled on OSS
experiments. The basic software tool, a wiki, allows dis-
tributed participants to work on the same body of text
simultaneously (just as versioning systems do for source
code). Wikipedia also admits everybody as contributor
(denominated as ‘editor’), and makes entries available to
everybody (with a GNU Public Documentation Licence
tailored to texts, the equivalent of the GPL for software).
So here again, just as with OSS, we find almost unlimited
trust in strangers from all over the globe. The numbers
involved are impressive. For the English Wikipedia alone,
apart from anyone being allowed to edit entries, 9.2 million
people have registered, and, as a result, may additionally
start a new article of their own. Roughly 1/3 of edits are
made anonymously, while 2/3 originate with registered
users. A similar ratio applies to other language versions.
Again we may pose the question: what mechanism of
trust is involved? What grounds can be advanced for
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trusting outsiders not to damage entries, introduce minor or
major mistakes, or edit the details of their own biogra-
phies? Again we encounter the problem that signalling
trustworthiness is difficult—most of the time IP-addresses
are the only signs available. This time, unlike the case of
OSS, no cultural supports for their initiative were to be
found; no relevant ethic had been developed as yet. It has
to be concluded, therefore, that we are dealing with an
absolute assumption of trust—the point of departure for
dealing with outside contributors being that they can be
fully trusted to contribute to the worthy cause of an
encyclopaedia by all and for all. But then, we may continue
to ask, can any good reasons be provided for this
assumption?
More than a decade ago, Philip Pettit (1995) proposed
the following underlying mechanism (dubbed ‘secondary
trust’): since people are sensitive to the esteem of others,
they will reply favourably to acts of trust in order to
actually reap this esteem. The chance to be admired cannot
be forfeited. Alternatively, people cherish some amount of
self-esteem and will therefore behave in a trustworthy
fashion in order to avoid feelings of shame. In our ency-
clopaedic context this reads as follows: outsiders who
stumble on this Web 2.0 experiment may decide to con-
tribute since they are seduced by the prospect of being
admired by core Wikipedians. Alternatively, they will
refrain from vandalizing contributions since they want to
avoid embarrassing themselves. This imputation of ‘nor-
mative pressure’ (in the Luhmannian sense) to the gesture
of entrusting a large body of text to the public at large
might have some plausibility.
Recently, though, this mechanism of normative pressure
has been reformulated by Victoria McGeer (2008). She
tries to move away from the calculating and cynical con-
ception of as-if trust in Pettit’s formulation. Instead, she
focuses on moves inspired by the kind of trust that does not
rely on coldly weighing the evidence available but is pre-
pared to go beyond (‘substantial trust’). This is based on a
vision of and hope in the capabilities of the other. The
trusting move hopefully energizes the other to realize his
capabilities to the full. Such trust is empowering the other,
not—a` la Pettit—seducing or manipulating the other. As
the prototype of this hopeful trust she presents the example
of parents who at appropriate times have to let their off-
spring go and engage in risky adventures. Such trust is a
hopeful wager on a future in which their children will be
able to take care of themselves.
To me, her theorizing about the assumption of trust
seems to be the more plausible avenue in the case of Wi-
kipedia. By opening up their entries to immediate modifi-
cation, contributors appeal to the encyclopaedic
capabilities of unknown others ‘out there’. They are
expressing substantial trust in unknown others based on a
vision of the ultimate attainment of the encyclopaedic ideal
of knowledge accessible to all and developed by all. These
anonymous visitors are challenged to show what they are
worth as commentators and/or composers of text. It is not
so much esteem or self-esteem that is at stake; it is the
prospect of exercising and developing one’s encyclopaedic
capabilities that spurs fellow participants into action. A
continuing cycle of high-quality contributions may ensue.
Inside Wikipedia there was full awareness that trust was
mainly an assumption based on such hopes. The assump-
tion of good faith in one’s co-editors is stressed repeatedly:
Assuming good faith is a fundamental principle on
Wikipedia: it is the assumption that editors’ edits and
comments are made in good faith. Most people try to
help the project, not hurt it. If this were false, a
project like Wikipedia would be doomed from the
beginning. (Wikipedia: AGF)
Even faced with evidence to the contrary (‘vandalism’),
one is urged to remain calm and cling to this assumption as
long as possible. Moreover the theme of ‘empowerment’ of
newcomers emerges clearly.
Remember, our motto and our invitation to the
newcomer is be bold [emphasis in original]. (…)
Understand that newcomers are both necessary for
and valuable to the community. By empowering
newcomers, we can improve the diversity of knowl-
edge, perspectives, and ideals on Wikipedia, thereby
preserving its neutrality and integrity as a resource
and ultimately increasing its value. In fact, it has been
found that newcomers are responsible for adding the
majority of lasting content to Wikipedia (i.e., sub-
stantive edits) (…). (Wikipedia: BITE)
A final quotation serves to show a clear awareness of the
fact that the fog of cyberspace causes a lack of clues and
almost forces an attitude of blanket trust without apparent
justification:
Attempting to believe the best of your fellow Wik-
ipedians, and they of you, helps to eliminate some of
the problems that arise when we communicate only in
text, and cannot use all the verbal and visual cues
used in talking face-to-face. (Wikipedia: CIV)
Wikiquette
So the Wikipedia adventure was founded on hope and
vision, but not on a full-blown underlying ethic among
potential contributors (as in the hackers’ case). Such an
ethic simply did not exist. Therefore, at the time Wikipedia
started, no one could forecast how people ‘out there’ would
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react. An encyclopaedic community was a novelty. In that
sense Wikipedia was more of an adventure than OSS, with
its decades of experience before the Internet boosted
collaboration.
Problems surfaced soon enough, though. Several varie-
ties of ‘disruptive’ behaviour emerged (Wikipedia: BP): on
the one hand, vandalism of entries (like changing small
details, inserting nonsense, adding obscenities or crude
humour, blanking pages, and changing details of one’s own
life; cf. Wikipedia: VAN); on the other hand, gross inci-
vilities, persistent harassment, and threats or attacks against
editors personally (on discussion forums, on talk pages, by
e-mail, etc.). A specific term was coined: ‘edit warring’,
referring to contributors fighting over the contents of an
entry from their own point of view by repeatedly deleting
each other’s changes (in the Wikipedian jargon these are
called ‘revert edits’, returning an article to an earlier ver-
sion). Notice that the reverts need not be unjustified as
such; rather it is the lack of any explicit comment or jus-
tification that may make the act, to many a participant, rude
and insulting. All kinds of rules were devised to deal with
the phenomenon after the fact and they are analyzed below.
What matters here is that simultaneously a kind of cultural
offensive was launched to develop a kind of ‘Wikipedian
ethic’ and fill the ethical vacuum that existed at the outset
of the experiment. The true Wikipedian had to be con-
structed de novo. To that effect, the original guideline at
the start of assuming good faith (Wikipedia: AGF) was
expanded into a coherent set of ethical rules for conduct.
Several entries in Wikipedia testify to these efforts.
Starting from the assumption of good faith, help other
editors gently to correct their mistakes if any (like intro-
ducing ‘original research’ or attacking someone person-
ally) (Wikipedia: AGF). Do not accuse anyone lightly of
bad faith; and above all, do not forget to show your own
good faith. The focus is on constructive argument in order
to be able to reach consensus over articles. Proposals for
textual changes or deletions should always be accompanied
by arguments (in the ‘talk pages’, with one’s name and date
attached). In the process, one should be civil and avoid
incivility (Wikipedia: CIV). Civility means: a considerate,
polite and respectful attitude to others (remember the
Golden Rule) in discussing differences of opinion. Inci-
vility—to be avoided—means: being rude, uttering insults
or profanities, personally attacking or harassing other edi-
tors, and the like. The atmosphere, moreover, should be
open and warm. Turn the other cheek if necessary, give
praise, and forgive! (Wikipedia: EQ).
This ‘Wikiquette’—as it is aptly called—is repeated in
guidelines for newcomers. As regards content, newcomers
are urged not to contribute an article about themselves or
their company, to add or delete content with caution and
with arguments only, and to avoid chatting or flaming
(Wikipedia: ACM). As for treating newcomers, established
Wikipedians are advised not to bite them and so scare them
away with hostility (Wikipedia: BITE). Be respectful and
constructive in correcting them (=civility); make them feel
welcome (=warm atmosphere); assume good faith on their
part (=good faith). Give them a chance! Ignorantia juris
(i.e., of Wikipedia law) and inexperience may be excused.
One can have faith in this approach, it is asserted, while
‘many new users who lack an intuitive grasp of Wikipedia
customs are gradually brought around once the logic
behind them becomes more clear’ (Wikipedia: AGF). This
approach is carried as far as making available pre-fabri-
cated templates cordially welcoming newbies into a project
(Wikipedia: WT).
So here we clearly find the articulation and fostering of a
‘Wikipedian ethic’ that is to underpin the basic premise of
trust towards fellow-Wikipedians. It is a civilization cam-
paign to keep the open approach to editing viable and alive.
The true Wikipedian had to be co-constructed with the
organizational design of Wikipedia (which is explored
below). While in OSS culture preceded structure, with
Wikipedia these have been evolving simultaneously. As a
result, confidence in fellow-Wikipedians has gradually
become more warranted. The trust involved is no longer
purely an assumption, but has partly become based on
inference; in particular on weak inference based on statis-
tical reasoning. Note, though, that this ‘civilization effect’
becomes weaker and weaker as we move from more
experienced Wikipedians towards less experiences ones.
By definition, newcomers to the project are not even aware
of—let alone bound by—any Wikipedian ethic.
Open-source software: rules and regulations
In OSS, the ‘bazaar’ soon came to be regulated. The
‘simple structure’ of project leaders-cum-followers no
longer sufficed, especially in projects that were growing in
size. Efficient management necessitated the introduction of
rules, regulations, and prescriptions. The most important
governance tools introduced in this formal phase are the
following (as described in de Laat 2007):
• Modularization. In many larger projects, the code tree
is divided into several subtrees. In this fashion, up to
dozens of modules may be carried out in parallel.
• Formalization. Technical tools and standardized pro-
cedures have been introduced to streamline virtual
cooperation. This applies to mutual discussion, report-
ing of bugs, working on the code tree simultaneously,
and testing.
• Division of roles. In almost any project nowadays roles
are distinguished that define what the occupant is
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allowed—and expected—to do inside the project. A
common role division consists of observer, developer
and project owner.
• Decision making. In every project decisions have to be
made about a range of matters; for example, the
methods to be used, acceptance of code in the main
tree, and preparing new releases. Decision-making
powers in such matters are formalized and in some
way distributed among participants.
As a result of the introduction of these governance tools
OSS projects assume a design. Differences in size,
technology, and phase of maturity will impinge on the
shape of a proper design; assumed designs will therefore
vary among projects. Moreover, for any individual OSS
project there will be a variety of possible designs; not one
but many options are open.
Can the introduction of governance in a project be
related to our issue of trusting virtual hackers in cyber-
space? As argued in the introduction, the argument in
general is that structuring may substitute the need for
establishing trustworthiness by restricting freedoms. Would
this mechanism by any chance apply to the specific context
of OSS? I intend to show in detail that it does: design
parameters do indeed substitute the need for trust, but the
extent to which members of the institution appreciate and
welcome this substitution varies.
In the following argument I start from considerations
that have been developed for ‘real life’ industrial organi-
sations by Fox (1974) (to return later to the focus of my
concern, open-source communities). The argument pro-
ceeds as follows. Rules from a design impinge on the
amount of discretion allowed to participants, discretion
referring to the extent to which the exercise of activities
calls for one’s own wisdom, judgment, expertise—as
opposed to following prescribed rules (Fox 1974: ch. 1).
Discretion, in turn, can be interpreted as the amount of trust
granted to participants by the institution involved. It rep-
resents the extent to which the institution consciously
regulates participants’ behaviour (Fox 1974: ch. 2). So
discretion is conceived of as the lynch-pin between rule
formation and trust. The usual effects of rule formation are
thus as follows: rules reduce discretion by increasing pre-
scription, thereby reducing dependence on the whims of
organizational members. As a result, the amount of trust
granted to them is reduced, and less trustworthiness is
needed on their part. Rules indeed substitute in part for the
need to rely on trust. This is thus the emergence of the third
way of handling trust.
This relation between design rules, discretion and trust
may, however, be accorded quite different valuations. Fox
(1974) conceives of design parameters as exclusively
coercive: they are the means by which leaders obtain
control over the workings of their members and can
enforce compliance. This is the usual function associated
with bureaucratic rules. In this instance, rules reducing
degrees of freedom—and thereby reducing discretion and
granted trust—are just exercises in coercion. Two decades
later, however, Adler and Borys (1996) argued that there
can be more to rules than that. Organizational parameters
may also have an enabling function: they are designed to
enable employees to master their task in more professional
ways. In my view this gives the following twist to the
reduction of discretion and trust involved. The parameters
in question focus on particular elements of discretion: those
that are seen as inducing waste of time and inefficiencies.
Curtailing these elements and no longer incorporating them
in the ‘trust package’ is then easily perceived as empow-
ering. In addition, as a rule recipients have more adequate
tools placed at their disposal, which allows them to per-
form their tasks in a novel and more professional fashion.
Substitution of trust is inspired by intentions to empower
organizational members—not to control them.
So far, this has been a classic organizational analysis. As
the next step in the argument I seek to maintain that a
hierarchy is also to be obeyed in virtual communities like
OSS. Project leaders or owners have powers of regulation
that are embedded in the virtual design of their projects.
Contributors may choose their tasks and leave whenever
they want, but in the meantime access to files has to be
granted, write access given, certain tools are obligatory,
and procedures have to be respected. Volunteers have to
play by these rules in order to be accepted by the com-
munity; otherwise they are just ignored. In view of this
hierarchy nexus there is a close correspondence between
organizations on the one hand and open-source communi-
ties on the other. As a result, the above organizational
analysis concerning rules, discretion and trust is mutatis
mutandis also applicable to such communities. In particu-
lar, design parameters in OSS communities—as analogues
of similar organizational parameters—may be interpreted
as being either of the coercive or the enabling kind.
Returning now to the four parameters for OSS distin-
guished above, how are they to be interpreted along these
lines of inquiry? Some would clearly seem to be enabling
in the sense just coined. Both modularization and formal-
ization streamline an otherwise chaotic process. This is
structuring as a minimal condition for fruitful collaboration
to occur. Formalization tools in particular may function as
tools that enhance programming capabilities (cf. Andrews
et al. 2005) and streamline software development (cf.
examples in Adler and Borys 1996). As a result, although
fewer freedoms are actually granted to contributors, this is
welcomed as leveraging members’ skills, not detested as
encroaching control. Robbins (2005) calls our attention to
the remarkable fact that the whole OSS community has
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standardized on the use of such formalization tools. I would
suggest this is so precisely because they are experienced as
empowering by all hackers concerned.
The introduction of role divisions and powers of deci-
sion making in OSS, on the other hand, is a more delicate
affair. These parameters may easily be considered con-
trolling, as they touch directly on the amount of essential
discretion that outside collaborators may enjoy. The choi-
ces for project leadership lie on a continuum. To make this
clear, I refer to the famous distinction between high-dis-
cretion and low-discretion work role patterns in organiza-
tions, developed in Fox (1974), and adapt it to my own
purposes in relation to OSS communities. At one end of the
scale, the role division employed in OSS may be minimal
and decision-making decentralized. The discretion granted
remains high—as high as the particular project allows. In
such a high-discretion design, trust in virtual strangers
remains high. As a result, outside contributors may be
expected to remain committed to the project and continue
contributing code or comments. At the opposite end of the
scale, a low-discretion design can be introduced in OSS: an
elaborate division of roles is carved out, with minimal
discretion for the lower echelons and decisional powers
highly centralized. Such a design effectively awards little
trust to contributors. While hackers may be supposed to be
attached to autonomy in their voluntary activities, they
might well interpret the design as a manoeuvre of control, a
way of expressing distrust in their very capacities and/or
intentions. As a result, volunteers might be chased away
from continued participation and enlist elsewhere.
Take Tigris, for example, a well-known platform that
hosts many OSS projects. The site carries an explanation
that a role consists of a set of permissions granted; a per-
mission allows specific activities (like reading or editing)
to be performed on specific resources on the project’s site
(like project documents or source code files) (http://www.
tigris.org/scdocs/DomAdminRoles.html.en). A common
threefold division of roles is the following (cf. http://www.
tigris.org/scdocs/ProjectRoles): an observer has read-only
access to most of the project’s documentation and source
code files, and may return comments and/or code proposals
and patches. A developer obtains more permissions: (s)he
also obtains write access to the official source code tree and
project text files. A project owner is someone at the top
who manages the project as a whole (and part of the job is
precisely to grant membership roles as just discussed).
Note the pivotal role of developers: they are the ones who
are empowered to incorporate changes in the code tree. To
gain role permissions, candidates have to qualify—though
standards seem quite relaxed. After surveying a project as
an anonymous guest (who are allowed to see most of the
project’s files), one may ask to be granted observer status;
this will as a rule be granted to anybody. Then, after
delivering some contributions of sufficient quality to the
project, one may obtain the status of developer. So one has
to prove oneself sufficiently professional only if the status
of developer is desired.
This design will do for many smaller projects, consisting
of just a few modules. Each module is run with an ‘owner’
at the top. The design is still quite similar to the ‘simple
structure’ from the initial, informal phase—still with a
rather large amount of discretion, but the structure will be
evolving for larger projects: of necessity, the design will
move in the direction of curtailing discretion. An often-
discussed example, at the lower end of discretion, is Linux.
In that vast project with a range of modules, ‘trusted
lieutenants’ (above the layer of maintainers of the modules)
are the ones who take all proposed changes into consid-
eration, with the final say still exercised by Linus Torvalds.
This is thus a very centralized design. In order to show that
intermediate designs exist and to highlight the choices that
can be made regarding role division and decision making,
two other, larger OSS projects will now be analyzed in
some detail: FreeBSD and Mozilla. These two projects
have made slightly different choices as far as design is
concerned.
FreeBSD and Mozilla
Let us first consider FreeBSD, an operating system that has
been in development by volunteers for decades now (the
following account is mainly based on Jørgensen (2001), but
updated for recent developments by consulting http://www.
freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/dev-model/). In
developing the source code modules the project distin-
guishes roles referred to as ‘general hats’. The following
roles are in use, quite comparable to those from Tigris:
contributors, committers and maintainers. After accessing
and exploring files anyone may start contributing com-
ments and/or code. By definition one then becomes a
contributor, no formalities are involved. Committers are
contributors who have formally obtained write access to
the code tree, and actually may commit code—either of
their own, or from fellow-developers (without write
access). Maintainers (recruited from the committers) are at
the top of a module and coordinate the incorporation of
new code.3
The procedure to be followed by a committer to get his
code accepted is instructive. After writing a contribution he
is urged first to discuss the changes with fellow committers.
3 Notice that for this large project a whole range of other ‘hats’ are in
use. Some ‘administrative hats’ with suggestive names are Docu-
mentation Project Manager, Quality Assurance, Release Coordina-
tion, Security Officer, Standards, and Bugmeister.
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Preferably, code has to be reviewed several times. As the
next step, he has to test the proposed changes by inte-
grating them in the module involved and trying to compile
the module as a whole (the build should not ‘break’). This
is a pre-test in his own downloaded copy of the current
development version. If the test has succeeded, it is up to
the committer to actually integrate the changes into the
official code tree. From then on, the changes are open to
debugging and commenting by anyone. So in effect,
committers decide (semi-) autonomously about the incor-
poration of pieces of code. The fact that the results of one’s
work immediately become visible and available to all is
reported to be a gratifying experience.
Not just anybody may rise up through this hierarchy.
True, anyone may look around and/or contribute, but in
order to become a committer, one has to qualify (http://
www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/dev-model/
model-processes.html). After having made a number of
high-quality contributions, a developer may request com-
mitter status. It is upon recommendation by a committer
that the so-called Core Team (above the layer of main-
tainers, consisting of nine members) will vote about
granting that status.
The other OSS project analyzed here is Mozilla, a well-
known web browser, mail client (and more). In order to
manage the development of the roughly 80 modules it
employs basically the same division of roles as Tigris and
FreeBSD (Holck and Jørgensen 2005; information updated
by consulting http://www.mozilla.org/about/roles.html).
Anyone is invited to contribute to the project (whether
code, debugging, translation, add-ons, interface design, or
documentation). After formal application a contributor may
become a committer (acquiring write access to the tree).
Modules as a whole are maintained by module owners, who
appoint assistants to help them if needed (called peers).
Their main task is to review all code changes to their
module.4
The procedure for contributing code is identical to
FreeBSD: discuss informally, test in your own working
copy of the tree, incorporate in the main tree, and let others
debug. There is one significant difference, though. The
decision about incorporating code changes in the official
tree is no longer within the committers’ authority. For
several years now they have needed to ask for permission
in two steps (http://www-archive.mozilla.org/hacking/
code-review-faq.html). First a contributor requests
approval from his module owner. Thereafter a so-called
‘super-review’ is called for: someone, preferably with
expertise in another domain, has to judge whether the patch
fits into the broader Mozilla code base and give his
approval. Several ‘super-reviewers’ have officially been
appointed for the purpose.
In accordance with this design, the procedure to
become a committer is quite strict (http://www.mozilla.org/
hacking/committer/). Basically, contributors first need to
demonstrate that they know what they are doing, by having
contributed some good patches. After that, they may for-
mally ask to obtain committer status. For this, they need
two people who want to vouch for their competences.
These ‘vouchers’, usually their module’s owner or a peer,
are responsible for them for a period of 3 months. More-
over, one of the super-reviewers must support their
nomination.
From these descriptions it transpires that both FreeBSD
and Mozilla are in the middle range of discretion granted to
outside contributors. Write access to the code tree is never
granted immediately or indiscriminately. However, deci-
sion making in Mozilla is more centralized than in Free-
BSD. Supervision has tightened. The layers of module
owners and super-reviewers are the judges of code incor-
poration, no longer the code developers themselves as in
FreeBSD.
Influential Mozilla leaders (namely B. Eich and D.
Hyatt) are quite explicit about the strategy that is to be
followed:
The faux-egalitarian model of CVS access and pan-
tree hacking that evolved from the earliest days of
Mozilla is coming to an end. (…) [One of the key
elements in the new roadmap is to] continue the move
away from an ownership model involving a large
cloud of hackers with unlimited CVS access, to a
model, more common in the open source world, of
vigorously defended modules with strong leadership
and clear delegation (…). (http://www-archive.
mozilla.org/roadmap/roadmap-02-Apr-2003.html)
It may be concluded that as OSS projects grow in size and
complexity, the trend towards introducing structure is
ineluctable. In the process, every project will have to find
its own design solution—within a range of possible
solutions. Whichever design is chosen, some trust in
evidence before is partly substituted by structure. As rules
and regulations take over, the importance of inferring that
outside, anonymous contributors are trustworthy is
reduced.
As a corollary of this section on OSS design it should be
noted that a recent trend can be discerned in many OSS
projects that outsiders are perceived as less trustworthy
from the outset (cf. de Laat 2007: p. 171). Fears seem to be
4 Just as in FreeBSD several other roles have been coined for
managing the whole undertaking: the ‘super-reviewer’ (performing an
extra check on the integration of new code; cf. below), the ‘bugzilla
component owner’ (managing the testing and debugging of a
component of a module), the ‘release driver’ (managing the release
of new versions), and the ‘benevolent dictator’ (handling conflict
resolution) (http://www.mozilla.org/about/roles.html).
336 P. B. de Laat
123
mounting about sloppy code, or buggy code, or even
Trojan horses being introduced into the main tree of a
project. Moreover, concerns about intellectual property
rights are mounting: whether deliberately or not, contrib-
utors could incorporate code bearing a licence that is
incompatible with the existing licensing arrangements, or
could import patented matter—with all the attendant dan-
gers of subsequent patent litigation. So the hacker ethic—
as described above—is considered to be eroding. In
response, potential committers of code are likely to be
subjected to screening—that is, more screening than the
usual procedure for ascertaining technical skills which
amounts to demonstrating some good work (cf. the pro-
cedures as described above for FreeBSD and Mozilla). In
Debian, for example, contributors who want to become
‘real’ developers with write access to the tree not only have
to demonstrate their technical capabilities, they also have
to reveal and prove their real-life identity, and show their
factual understanding of and ideological attachment to the
cause of OSS (‘Debian new maintainer process’; described
on http://debian.org/devel/join/newmaint; cf. also Coleman
and Hill 2005). This tightening of entry qualifications is a
clear move from inferring trust in a general sense (a ‘cli-
mate’ of trust) to inferring trust in a specific sense. Solid
proof of being a ‘true’ hacker is required.
Wikipedia: rules and regulations
Let us now turn to developments in Wikipedia. In this
project, too, rules and regulations soon came to be applied.
I contend that the same type of analysis applies as that
developed above for OSS. Governance tools were intro-
duced, such as modularization (several subprojects were
introduced under the umbrella of Wikimedia, such as Wi-
kipedia, Wiktionary and Wikibooks; within them, each
entry is a module in itself) and formalization (rules for
editing pages, for discussing changes, for reporting and
handling vandalism, and so on). These do not merit further
discussion here since they clearly seem to belong to the
category of ‘enabling’ tools in a virtual environment. In
addition, a division of roles and rules for decision making
was introduced. These parameters merit closer attention,
since the resulting design may vary from a high-discretion
design to a low-discretion one. Which kind of design
actually did crystallize within Wikipedia? I intend to show,
first, that the design that was gradually introduced is
characterized by a very high degree of discretion—even
higher than for OSS—and accordingly by great trust shown
towards outside contributors. Furthermore, it is shown that,
at the time of writing, pressures are mounting to reduce this
discretion and be more careful about granting trust; all this
as a response to increasing vandalism and harassment.
The best way to explore the design is to start with the
division of roles (those employed within the English Wi-
kipedia in particular) (Wikipedia: UAL). Just as in the
Tigris division of roles, what this is all about is obtaining
permission to perform specific activities upon specific
resources on the site. Users come in three varieties. The
anonymous user (no account) may read and edit all entries.
As soon as (s)he has created an account (username, pass-
word), a user may in addition create new pages, as well as
e-mail other users who publicly mention their address. A
user automatically obtains the ‘autoconfirmed’ status with
special privileges—such as moving pages, uploading files,
and editing ‘semi-protected’ pages (to be explained
below)—as soon as (s)he has made 10 edits and has been
registered for 4 days in a row.
Above these user levels other roles have been defined
that mostly have to do with protecting Wikipedia against
disruptive behaviour. In order to hold disruptions in check,
administrators (also known as sysops) obtain the right to
protect pages, delete pages and block users (see below);
about 850 of them are active at the time of writing. Very
trusted users may become bureaucrats, who are entitled to
appoint users as administrators or fellow bureaucrats (about
30 active at this time). Both role occupants are not simply
appointed from above; they must apply formally and be
accepted by the broader community after public discussion,
which is usually lengthy.5
The administrators, as ‘police officers’ (my terminol-
ogy) of Wikipedia, have several measures at their disposal
to deal with incidents of disruptive behaviour. They may
introduce ‘page protection’: a page involved in a dispute
can no longer be edited or moved, usually for 7or 14 days
(Wikipedia: PP). ‘Full protection’ means that no user is
admitted, while ‘semi-protection’ means that autocon-
firmed users still are. Whichever protection applies,
administrators may still touch and edit the page involved.
Protection is useful as a cease-fire period, to allow con-
testants to resolve their conflicts. Similarly, administrators
may delete pages, as a last resort, to deal with vandalism,
but also in cases where reliable resources are absent, or
copyrights are violated (Wikipedia: DEL).
Another measure that administrators can apply in case of
serious disruptions by particular users is to ‘block’ them,
that is, bar them from any further activities on the site
(except for reading) (Wikipedia: BP). A block can last a
day or longer, depending on the circumstances. It is
5 Although these are the main roles, a whole array of others can be
found that I shall not go into here such as: the ‘rollbacker’ user (who
obtain the means and the authority to quickly revert revisions), the
‘checkuser’ (who may run a check on all IP-addresses used by
accounts of users suspected of misdemeanour), and the ‘oversight’
user (who may permanently hide revisions of pages from all users)
(Wikipedia: RIGHTS).
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intended to protect the Wikipedia project, not to punish the
user involved. A particular example of behaviour that is
considered incontrovertible evidence of edit warring is
performing three reverts of any single page within
24 hours. Anyone indulging in this may be blocked from
further editing (the ‘three-revert rule’; Wikipedia: 3RR). In
the same vein, someone who stealthily creates an alterna-
tive account so as to push their personal point of view
twice, or to stir up controversy (a ‘sock puppet’) also risks
being blocked (Wikipedia: SOCK). The same measure may
apply to a user who lets someone else register in order to
push his/her own point of view (‘meatpuppet’), or alter-
natively push the opposite point of view (‘straw man sock
puppet’).
Note that the police officers involved are also assisted by
software bots, which are entitled to revert changes that
most obviously emanate from vandalism or edit warring.
As a result of this policing of Wikipedia by both men and
machines, such changes are reportedly corrected within a
very short period of time (median correction time from 2 to
3 min; figures refer to October 2005; Viegas et al. 2007).
This rapid repair mechanism is a form of what is called
‘soft security’—protecting the system in unobtrusive ways,
almost invisibly, and after the fact.
How may one characterize the design crystallized within
the English Wikipedia? Users may edit at will, change
whatever they like, even if they are unregistered and
anonymous. Trust in their potential contributions is high.
Meanwhile, as we have seen, limits have been set on
contributing: no edit wars, no vandalism, and no harass-
ment. Rules such as the three-revert-rule or the sockpuppet
rule are bureaucratic rules that define how far one may go.
Enforcement of these rules is entrusted to administrators
who may apply disciplinary sanctions. However, most
Wikipedians consider these rules necessary for conflict
resolution. Moreover, the ‘officials’ involved are urged to
‘exercise care’ and ‘behave in a respectful, civil manner’
(Wikipedia: ADM), resolve conflict by ‘patience and
talking’, and stick as long as possible to the basic premise
that fellow Wikipedians are acting ‘in good faith’ (Wiki-
pedia: AFNN). Taking all these elements together I would
argue that the design was—and still is—a high-discretion
one, with the regular user at the helm, as far as that is
reasonably possible in an open environment. This design
still applies, presumably, while users are considered to be
the main assets on which the destiny of the encyclopaedia
depends. Without their massive voluntary collaboration,
Wikipedia would have suffered the same fate as Nupedia.
Peer production of (encyclopaedic) knowledge is taken to
its logical limit: ‘democratic’ production by all.
Remarkably, the trust granted is even higher than was
ever the case in OSS. For software, contributors who want
to acquire write access to the code tree have always been
held to some proof of their coding capabilities. Becoming a
committer was always a privilege. Moreover, maintainers
often do own modules in the sense of actively overseeing
code patches from committers. In Wikipedia, by contrast,
users have always had immediate write access to articles
and other pages, no capability test or review of submitted
changes is required. The motto is: let everyone be a Wi-
kipedia committer.
Flagged revisions scheme
However, there are increasing signs that the era of
unquestioning trust in strangers is coming to an end. Dis-
cretion is circumscribed in tiny steps. A first, hardly
noticeable step had to do with an incident concerning the
journalist John Seigenthaler: an anonymous user created a
biographical entry about him containing false content (May
2005; Wikipedia: Seigenthaler_hoax). It went undetected
for several months. In response, Wales barred unregistered
users from creating new pages. From December 2005
onwards, an anonymous visitor may no longer create a new
page but only read and edit existing entries.
A more serious encroachment on full discretion for all is
the call for review: all changes should be checked for
vandalism before incorporating them in the ‘stable’ version
of a page. While the system is still under discussion for the
English Wikipedia, it has already been unrolled gradually
in the German, Russian, Hungarian, Polish and Arabic
versions (since 2008). The software involved can create
many varieties of reviewing systems. As regards the kind
of entries to be reviewed, some argue for reviewing only
the most sensitive ones (like biographies of living persons),
others for reviewing all of them. Furthermore, who is to be
censured? Only anonymous users, or contributors at large?
As for the reviewers themselves, should they be a select
group of trusted users, or all (registered) users? And finally
there is the question of what a visitor actually gets to see on
the screen: the ‘stable’ version, or the ‘experimental’ ver-
sion containing one or more as yet unreviewed edits?
The approach chosen by the German Wikipedia is the
following (German Wikipedia: Gesichtete_Versionen;
Wikipedia: Flagged revisions/Sighted versions; http://de.
labs.wikimedia.org/wiki/Hauptseite). All entries fall under
the system, and edits from all contributors are to be
reviewed (but see exception below). Reviews are carried
out by Sichter (literally: sifters). Registered users auto-
matically obtain such rights (‘aktive Sichterrechte’) after
performing at least 300 edits and having been active for at
least 60 days. With less experience—at least 150 edits and
30 days of activity—users become exempted from the
review process themselves: their edits or articles do not
need to be reviewed and automatically turn up in the
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‘stable’ version (‘autoreview rights’; ‘passive Sic-
hterrechte’) (German Wikipedia: Gesichtete_Versionen).
On the screen, unregistered users get to see the so-called
sighted (flagged) version (as default)—although they can
click on the newest, unsighted version if they wish. For
registered users the most recent version is the default. The
trick of this default setting is that anonymous vandalism no
longer gains immediate gratification: their changes do not
show up in the official version.
While Wikipedians in the German tongue (and some
other languages, mainly Eastern European) are mostly
satisfied with the flagged revisions scheme, it is hard to
swallow for those using the English tongue. Heated and
protracted discussion is still raging on talk pages. Various
alternatives are being proposed, such as ‘delayed revi-
sions’—delaying edits made by users below the autocon-
firmed status: they turn up in the official version after
2 hours (Wikipedia: Delayed revisions); or ‘deferred revi-
sions’—only suspect edits, identified by an abuse filter,
come under the flagged revisions scheme (Wikipedia:
Deferred revisions). There is also vehement defence of the
most recent version being shown to all users.
An opponent of the flagged revisions scheme observes:
‘‘The idea that we trust some users more than others on
content is terrible’’ (17 January 2009; English Wikipedia,
on the talk page about flagged revisions). Indeed, such trust
as is granted is effectively differentiated by the scheme.
Lines of division are drawn: between those who may do the
reviewing and those who may not (Sichter vs. other users);
between those who may edit without review and those who
may not (users with autoreview rights vs. users without
them); and between those who get to see the most recent
version immediately, and those who are referred to the
(possibly less recent) ‘stable’ version (registered users vs.
anonymous users). The autoreview rights in particular are
interpreted as creating a new elite by themselves. Trust-
worthiness regarding contributions is no longer assumed
from the outset; it has to be demonstrated by one’s editing
track record within Wikipedia. The mechanism of inferring
trust from past performance is therefore instituted in con-
nection with these new roles. Remarkably, in the initial
German proposal the threshold for obtaining auto-review
rights was considerably higher than for obtaining ‘aktive
Sichterrechte’; fierce discussion obviously lowered the
threshold.
Effectively, Wikipedia’s design is moving towards a
lower level of discretion; a move that is laudable to most
German Wikipedians, but detestable to most English ones.
This difference in appreciation can be linked to a distinc-
tion made earlier: between enabling and constraining rules.
Obviously, the English feel offended by the curtailing of
their discretion and the attendant differentiation of privi-
leges. The scheme is interpreted as outright constraint—to
them, bureaucracy (in the pejorative sense of the term) is
setting in. On the other hand, the German interpretation of
the flagged revisions scheme is that these bureaucratic rules
enable the proper working of the encyclopaedia while
curbing vandalism. Discretion is gladly sacrificed in order
to gain in efficiency. Why, in the end, English speaking and
German speaking Wikipedians differ so much in their
diagnosis is an intriguing question—one that is ripe for
investigation.
In the near future, Wikipedia—more surely the German
than the English language version—also intends to intro-
duce a more strict kind of review, one that checks the
quality of articles. This will be done by Pru¨fer, also
referred to as u¨ber-reviewers or surveyors. A useful com-
parison with Citizendium can be made here. That open
source general encyclopaedia of more recent origin (2007)
explicitly honours expertise, and distinguishes the roles of
‘authors’, ‘editors’ and ‘constables’ (http://en.citizendium.
org/). Their ‘authors’ are comparable to registered users in
Wikipedia, their ‘constables’ are the equivalent of admin-
istrators in Wikipedia. And the Citizendium ‘editors’?
These are acknowledged experts who guide the crafting of
articles and approve the various versions; they come close
to the proposed Pru¨fer. So in conception and design Wi-
kipedia can be seen to be moving closer to Citizendium.
Finally, note that Wikipedian Pru¨fer and Citizendium
‘editors’ are functionally similar to module owners in the
average OSS project. As regards design, open-source
encyclopaedias and OSS are arguably converging. One
difference remains, though: code repositories are owned by
the leader(s) of the project, while encyclopaedic entries are
owned by nobody.
Conclusions
Open-source communities rely squarely on the contribu-
tions of mostly anonymous strangers in cyberspace, so a
central concern, whenever these focus on ever-evolving
content, such as software modules or encyclopaedic
entries, is the problem of whether and to what extent such
volunteers can be trusted to contribute in good faith and in
a competent fashion. It has been argued that such com-
munities do indeed have a whole array of mechanisms at
their disposal to handle this matter of trust: Table 1 lists the
mechanisms involved.
When rules and regulations are still few and far
between, the full weight falls on the processes of inferring
or assuming the presence of trust. Some assurances may be
generated by an underlying shared culture. When hackers
started to use the Internet to develop OSS, they had been
cooperating with each other for decades in ‘real life’ and
developing a shared ‘hacker ethic’. On the Internet they
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now bumped into a younger generation of new hackers. If
Mizrach (1997) is right, their ‘new hacker ethic’ shared a
considerable overlap with the old one. As a result the
potential open source audience as a whole was tied to some
kind of hacker ethic and their trustworthiness would appear
to be guaranteed. The Wikipedia experiment was not so
fortunate: no ‘encyclopaedic ethic’ existed at the outset, so
when vandalism and harassment started to emerge—
revealing that not all anonymous contributors could merely
be assumed to be trustworthy—the community hurriedly
embarked on a campaign to educate actual and potential
Wikipedians. In so far as contributors come to feel bound
by this emerging ‘Wikiquette’, they can surely be trusted to
further the encyclopaedic cause.
In general, inference of trustworthiness preferably relies
on solid signs from the particular trustee involved. Open-
source communities, however, depend on anonymous
strangers who usually do not reliably signal anything and
are merely represented by the IP addresses assigned to
them. Such communities can therefore only try to gauge
the existence of a climate of trust among their potential
contributors in general and infer in a weak sense that they
probably can be trusted. Due to the veil cast by the Internet,
open-source communities are condemned to forming
probability estimates of trustworthiness in place of cer-
tainties. Note, though, that another, more robust option for
inferring trust is becoming available. Lately, within OSS
circles the hacker ethic is seen to be eroding. In response
some projects subject role occupants to stricter screening,
especially when granting commit privileges is at stake.
Solid proof of one’s allegiance to the hacker ethic is
required. ‘Strong’ inference of trust, therefore, may replace
‘weak’ inference of trust.
As long as an appropriate kind of ethic seems to be
lacking within the community, assuming trust is the
prominent mechanism, by default. Wikipedia has been
shown to be a case in point. Posting encyclopaedic entries
on the Internet as a wiki is an appeal to fellow Wikipedians
to show their editing capabilities. It is a sign of ‘sub-
stantial’ trust (in the sense of McGeer 2008). This theo-
rizing about the ‘normative pressure’ emanating from
opening up content would seem to confirm the conjecture
that, especially in cyberspace, assuming trust is an impor-
tant mechanism for creating trust in the first place (cf. de
Laat 2005). In this vein both Wikipedia and diaristic blogs
revealing personal intimacies (as analyzed in de Laat 2008)
seem to rely boldly on the mechanism that trust can be
produced ex post.
Sooner or later open-source communities start to intro-
duce rules and regulations to manage the complexities
involved. The governance tools distinguished above are
modularization, formalization, division of roles and deci-
sion making. While the first two parameters would seem to
meet with universal approval among participants, the last
two need to be introduced with care. An important choice
has to do with the amount of discretion granted to collab-
orators. In a high-discretion design, role division is mini-
mal and decision making decentralized; as a result, the trust
granted remains high. A low-discretion design, with elab-
orate division of roles and centralized decision making,
leaves little discretion to collaborators; as a result, trust is
to a large extent substituted.
This third mechanism of substitution of trust was first
explored with reference to OSS projects. A typical division
of roles consists of contributors, committers and main-
tainers (or module owners). I have shown how FreeBSD
tends towards a higher discretion design, while Mozilla
tends towards a design of lower discretion. Similarly, the
encyclopaedic Wikipedia project has become the subject of
design. The fact is that their contributors retain a broad
measure of discretion: anonymous users may still edit
entries of their choice (and may create new entries after
registration). Rising vandalism has not been combated by
reducing the discretion of ordinary users, but by introduc-
ing ‘administrators’ who are granted powers to block par-
ticular users and freeze articles involved in edit wars. As a
result, users stay at the helm in Wikipedia.
Nevertheless, rampant vandalism has led to mounting
pressures within Wikipedia for another measure: review of
all changes (edits) with regard to vandalism. This system is
undoubtedly a step that will reduce the discretion of
ordinary users. It leads to the introduction of levels of
Table 1 Open-source
communities and mechanisms
used for handling the problem
of trusting contributors
Open-source software Encyclopaedias
Assumption of trust (substantial trust) Trust in ‘encyclopaedic’
capabilities
Inference of trust (weak form) Hacker ethic Wikiquette
Inference of trust (strong form) Past performance
Entry examinations
Past performance
Substitution of trust (from a small
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trustworthiness, measured by one’s past performance
within Wikipedia. Interestingly, this is not uniformly
appreciated across language versions. It has already been
introduced in the German Wikipedia (and some others),
where the majority applauds the rules as a contribution to
the fight against vandalism. Their English-speaking fellow
Wikipedians, however, vehemently resist its introduction
as an encroachment on their editing rights. To them, this is
the onset of bureaucratic control. This finding suggests that
intercultural perceptions of open-source design may differ
considerably. This would seem to be an interesting research
field, ripe for exploration: how essentially the same virtual
organization is perceived, evaluated and designed across
different cultural domains.
As a logical extension, plans are afoot within Wikipedia
to appoint ‘super-reviewers’ who are to check articles for
their quality. If and when such a system of review plus
super-review may become standard practice, the user will
no longer reign supreme in crafting Wikipedian entries.
Such a development would imply two remarkable pro-
cesses of ‘structural convergence’: on the one hand, Wales’
encyclopaedia would then be governed in a similar fashion
to comparable—but smaller—virtual encyclopaedic
undertakings like Citizendium, h2g2 and Knol. These
projects also apply review procedures to guarantee quality.
On the other hand, generally speaking, roles within online
open encyclopaedic projects would then resemble those
that are usually discerned in OSS. The open-source com-
munities for producing encyclopaedias on the one hand and
software on the other would be managed in similar ways.
The communities involved would seem to be concurring on
the verdict that open-content production cannot do without
a process of moderation. For all of them, unquestioning
trust in users has proved to be an unworkable assumption.
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